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THE VIABILITY OF THE COPYRIGHT
MISUSE DEFENSE
I. Introduction
Under the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands," courts will deny
an otherwise meritorious claim where the claimant has acted so im-
properly that the need to punish the claimant's wrongful behavior
outweighs the need to punish the defendant's allegedly unlawful con-
duct.' The principle underlying the doctrine is that equity presumes
harm when an unclean plaintiff obtains relief; consequently, one who
desires justice must come into court with a "clean slate."12 The theory
of intellectual property misuse, which stems from the "unclean
hands" doctrine,3 prevents a plaintiff from enforcing an intellectual
property right if that plaintiff is guilty of misconduct with respect to
that right.4
The misuse doctrine5 originated in the field of patent law 6 as an
affirmative defense to patent infringement suits.7 Because the patent
grant' is limited to specific claims as defined by the patent,9 a paten-
1. Playboy Enterprises v. Chuckleberry Publishing, 486 F. Supp. 414, 435 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). To invoke "unclean hands" in copyright actions, for example, the defendant must
prove that the plaintiff's "transgression is of serious proportions and relates directly to
the subject matter of the infringement action." MELVIN NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 13-148.1-49 (1992).
2. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst, 746 F. Supp. 320, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
3. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., No. 91 C 1964, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2690, at
*35 (N.D. Ill. March 6, 1992); Hearst, 746 F. Supp. at 329-30.
4. See supra note 3.
5. The misuse defense is a claim by the defendant that the plaintiff has improperly
extended the patent beyond its four corners, requiring dismissal of plaintiff's suit for
infringement. See infra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
6. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); see also United States
Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957); qad, inc. v. ALN Assoc.,
770 F. Supp. 1261, 1266-67 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd in part and dismissed in part on other
grounds, 974 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992) (because the district court did not render a finaljudgment on the copyright issues, the Seventh Circuit lacked jurisidiction to review the
district court's holding with respect to the copyright misuse defense); ERNEST LIPSCOMB,
WALKER ON PATENTS § 22:10, at 452 (1992). A patent is the written embodiment of an
invention. The description of the invention in the patent is called the "specification,"
which is broken down into parts called "claims." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). See generally
ROBERT HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 5.1, at 115-16 (1991).
7. Jere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuse: Recent Devel-
opments in the Misuse Doctrine, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 339, 339 (May
1991). In general, a patent infringer is one who makes, uses or sells a patented invention
without the permission of the patent owner. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
8. A patent grant extends to the creator of a useful invention the exclusive right to
make, use or sell that invention throughout the United States for a period of 17 years. 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1988). See generally HARMON, supra note 6 § 1.1, at 3-5.
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tee10 cannot be permitted to extend his property right beyond the four
comers of the patent.II A patentee who intentionally 2 and illegally
extends his property right will be found guilty of patent misuse, bar-
ring him from enforcing his patent until the improper conduct is cor-
rected or "purged."' 1 3
The rationale for preventing enforcement of a misused patent is
that society in general is harmed when a patentee impermissibly
withholds, under color of the patent, something which is not part of
the patent, and therefore, does not belong to him. 4 Consequently,
misuse is an equitable defense, 5 which an alleged infringer can raise
regardless of whether he has been affected in any way by the alleged
misuse. 6 As such, the misuse doctrine serves an important public
purpose in patent law by preventing a patentee from reaping where he
has not sown.1 7
Like patent law, copyright law also serves the public interest by
granting the creator broad and exclusive rights to his work, while
preventing the creator from claiming that which is not his.18 How-
9. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917);
Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
10. A "patentee" is the owner of a patented invention. See generally HARMON, supra
note 6, § 1.1, at 3-5.
11. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490-92 (1942). The "four
corners of a patent" refers to everything within the claims of a patent, to the exclusion of
all else. Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc., 859 F.2d at 882; see generally HARMON, supra note
6, § 5.6, at 138-54. Thus, the lawful scope of a patent is necessarily defined by its claims.
HARMON, supra note 6, § 5.6, at 138-54. Although some commentators have argued that
there is no general theory of misuse, see, e.g., Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse De-
fense: The Role of Antitrust Standards, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1295-96 (1991), this is
plainly not so. The court simply defines the scope of the patent, and then determines, on
equitable grounds, if the patentee has extended his property right beyond this scope.
Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. at 492-94; LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 22:10, at 452-53.
12. Bad faith is necessary to a finding of misuse. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 22:10, at
452; Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam, Inc., 616 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983). The misuse defense is unavailable against a
patentee who mistakenly extends his patent right beyond its proper scope. Id. at 1140-
41.
13. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957);
B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942); Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493. An
example of patent misuse is the practice (known as "tying") of forcing a licensee (one
who purchases a license) to purchase an unpatented product along with the patent li-
cense. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492-95; see infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
14. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494; LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 28:32, at 335-37.
15. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 28:32, at 335-37.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Webb, supra note 7, at 340. In the United States, a copyright grant extends to the
creator of an original work of authorship, fixed in any tangible medium of expression, the
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ever, the applicability of the misuse doctrine to copyright law is in
doubt among the courts.19 This Note argues that the misuse doctrine,
long established in patent law, should be fully extended to copyright
law. Like patent misuse, copyright misuse should be an affirmative
and equitable defense to a suit for infringement. 20  A copyright
holder, like a patentee, should not be permitted to enforce his copy-
right if he intentionally extends the copyright grant beyond its lawful
scope.2 ' Recognition of a copyright misuse defense will serve pur-
poses similar to the patent misuse defense, preventing copyright own-
ers from deliberately overextending copyright grants.22
Although the misuse defense was discussed in the context of a
copyright action in dictum as early as 1948,23 the first court to employ
the misuse defense to actually render a copyright unenforceable was
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1990.24 The Supreme
Court, however, has not yet ruled on the viability of the misuse de-
fense in copyright infringement actions.25
Currently, a split of authority exists among the federal circuit
courts which have addressed the issue of whether the misuse defense
should be extended to copyright law.26 Courts in older cases have
exclusive rights (with some limitations) to reproduce, distribute, and (in some cases) per-
form the work for the author's life plus 50 years. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-412 (1988). A copy-
right exists upon fixation of the work, but a copyright holder cannot enforce his rights
until the work is registered with and approved by the United States Copyright Office. 35
U.S.C. § 412 (1988).
19. See Webb, supra note 7, at 339-42; infra note 29.
20. See infra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. Webb, supra note 7, at 339-40.
23. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 848-50 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal
dismissed, 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
24. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1990).
25. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., No. 91 C 1964, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2690, at
*35 (N.D. Ill. March 6, 1992); The Supreme Court may have implicitly recognized the
existence of the defense by reversing and remanding an antitrust ruling "and the copy-
right misuse judgment dependent upon it." Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S.
1, 24 (1979); see also, United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). Indeed, in the
same case, Justice Stevens indicated his acceptance of the defense. Broadcast Music, 441
U.S. at 28 ("The rules [governing patent misuse] . . . are equally applicable to copy-
rights."). However, the Supreme Court has failed to rule explicitly on the viability of the
misuse defense independent of an antitrust violation. Note, supra note 11, at 1292.
26. Three circuits and several district courts have explicitly or implicitly accepted the
doctrine. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1992) (copy-
right misuse found where plaintiff forbid any company from participating in any way in
the future development of its copyrighted computer program); Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. 91-1293, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21817, at *39-40 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 10, 1992); Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786
F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986); Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., No. C-91-3871, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4028, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 1992) (misuse exists upon a finding of
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held that the misuse defense is inapplicable in copyright infringement
actions.27 Recently, however, many courts have held that the defense
is viable in copyright infringement actions, but only to the extent that
the misuse rises to the level of an antitrust violation.28 Some courts
have held that the misuse defense is available in copyright infringe-
ment actions, and that the misuse need not rise to the same level as a
violation of antitrust law.29 These courts have found misuse where
the copyright owner had attempted to enforce his copyright in a way
that exceeded the scope of his copyright grant.a° This Note advocates
extending the misuse doctrine to copyright infringement actions con-
fraud, or a "clear violation of a legal duty"); National Cable Television Ass'n v. Broad-
cast Music, Inc., No. 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389, at *130-31 (D.D.C. Aug.
16, 1991) (recognizing misuse where a copyright owner violates the public policy underly-
ing the copyright law); Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(copyright misuse may be found "based on blanket licensing practices if there are no
alternatives ... realistically available"); qad, inc. v. ALN Assoc., 770 F. Supp. 1261,
1267-70 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd in part dismissed in part on other grounds, 974 F.2d 834
(7th Cir. 1992) (copyright misuse found where plaintiff failed to disclose that its copy-
right computer program contained material copied from work in the public domain).
Three circuits have explicitly or implicitly rejected the doctrine. Bellsouth Advertising &
Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, 933 F.2d 952 (1 th Cir. 1991); United
Tel. Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988); Saturday
Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1987).
27. See, e.g., Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
28. See, e.g., Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing,
933 F.2d 952 (1 th Cir. 1991); United Tel. Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Publishing Co.,
855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988); Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816
F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1987). Antitrust law involves claims of monopolization. HARMON,
supra note 6, § 1.4, at 13-14. In patent law, an allegation of an antitrust violation is used
as a counterclaim alleging that a patentee's use of his patent creates an unfair monopoly.
Id. See infra Part III.B. for a discussion of the relationship between misuse and antitrust
law.
29. See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1992)
(copyright misuse found where plaintiff forbid any company from participating in any
way in the future development of its copyrighted computer program); Atari Games Corp.
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. 91-1293, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21817, at *39-40 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 10, 1992); Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors,
786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986); Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., No. C-91-3871,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4028, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 1992) (misuse exists upon a
finding of fraud, or a "clear violation of a legal duty"); National Cable Television Ass'n v.
Broadcast Music, Inc., No. 90-0262, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389, at *130-31 (D.D.C.
Aug. 16, 1991) (recognizing misuse where a copyright owner violates the public policy
underlying the copyright law); Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (copyright misuse may be found "based on blanket licensing practices if there are
no alternatives ... realistically available"); qad, inc. v. ALN Assoc., 770 F. Supp. 1261,
1267-70 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd in part dismissed in part on other grounds, 974 F.2d. 834
(7th Cir. 1992) (copyright misuse found where plaintiff failed to disclose that its copy-
right computer program contained material copied from work in the public domain).
30. See supra note 29.
COPYRIGHT MISUSE DEFENSE
sistent with this last approach, which will be referred to here as the
"scope of the grant" test.
Part II of this Note reviews the substantive development and proce-
dural posture of the misuse defense in the context of patent infringe-
ment actions. Part III considers the parallel development of
copyright and patent law as a justification for extending the misuse
doctrine to copyright infringement actions, and distinguishes the mis-
use doctrine from antitrust violations. Part IV enunciates a test for
applying the misuse defense in copyright infringement actions. Part V
concludes that the misuse defense should be available in copyright
infringement actions to prevent a copyright owner from enforcing his
copyright if he has impermissibly extended his copyright beyond the
scope of the copyright grant.3a
II. The Patent Misuse Defense
A. The Substantive Law of Patent Misuse
The patent misuse doctrine was first articulated in 1942 by the
Supreme Court in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. 32 Plaintiff-
appellee, G.S. Suppiger Co. ("G.S. Suppiger"), owned the patent on a
machine for depositing salt tablets in cans. 3 G.S. Suppiger licensed
this machine to members of the canning industry. 4 In the suit, G.S.
Suppiger alleged that Morton Salt Co. ("Morton Salt") had infringed
the patent's claims by making and selling an equivalent salt-deposit-
ing machine.35
G.S. Suppiger also manufactured unpatented salt tablets, 36 and re-
quired licensees of the salt-depositing machine to buy these unpat-
ented salt tablets.37 This practice of requiring licensees to purchase
unpatented products along with the patent license is a common prac-
tice known as "tying."' 38 The Supreme Court held that this "tying"
practice was a deliberate attempt by G.S. Suppiger to claim exclusive
rights over something it had not invented. 39 This, the Court said, was
patent misuse,40 which constituted an absolute defense to any in-
31. See supra note 18.
32. 314 U.S. 488, 490-94 (1942).
33. Id. at 489.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 490-91.
36. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 489.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 490-91.
39. Id. at 493-94.
40. Id.
1992]
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fringement claim.41 The Court refused to enforce the patent for the
salt-depositing machine, and dismissed the lawsuit.42
The Court's reasoning in Morton Salt was based on the principle
that a patent grants the patentee exclusive rights only over that partic-
ular device claimed in the patent.43 Because a patent "affords no im-
munity for a monopoly not within the grant,"" anything not claimed
in the patent is excluded from protection.45 Indeed, the public in gen-
eral suffers if an individual claims exclusive rights over something he
did not create, because that individual removes from the public that
which does not belong to him.46 Thus, any deliberate attempt to
claim such exclusive rights constitutes patent misuse, rendering the
entire patent unenforceable.47
Since Morton Salt, courts have consistently refused to enforce a pat-
ent which has been extended beyond the scope of the patent grant.48
Indeed, the doctrine of patent misuse has been reaffirmed by both the
United States Supreme Court49 and the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit,50 which has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. 5'
B. Proving Patent Misuse - Procedural Aspects of the Doctrine
Patent misuse is an affirmative defense to a suit for patent infringe-
ment. 2 The alleged patent infringer must plead and prove the misuse
by a preponderance of the evidence.5 3 To establish misuse, the alleged
infringer must prove that the patentee: 1) acted intentionally in bad
41. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493-94.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 490-94.
44. Id. at 491.
45. Id. at 490-94.
46. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490-94.
47. Id. at 490-94. Of course, once the patentee corrects the misuse, the patent is once
again enforceable. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
48. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 22:10, at 452; see also, United States Gypsum Co. v.
National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 463-65 (1957).
49. United States Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. at 463-65; Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
50. Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., 833 F.2d 1575, 1576-78 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Allen Arch-
ery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
51. Christianson v. Colt Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1550-60 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Rulings of the Federal Circuit are the law everywhere on any patent issues it has consid-
ered unless overruled by the United States Supreme Court. Id.
52. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 26:9 at 466-67; Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc.,
782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d
604 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
53. See supra note 29.
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faith,54 and 2) claimed exclusive rights over something outside the
patent grant. 55
A finding of misuse by the court does not invalidate the patent; it
simply renders the patent unenforceable until the misuse is termi-
nated.5 6 Thus, a finding of misuse precludes the patentee from ob-
taining relief for infringement.5 Once a patentee demonstrates that
the consequences of his prior misuse have been corrected, however,
the patent is once again enforceable, and the patentee may bring suit
for infringement. 58 For example, in Morton Salt, if the patentee, G.S.
Suppiger, had modified its licenses so that they covered only the pat-
ented salt dispensing machine and not the unpatented salt tablets,59
G. S. Suppiger would have been able to maintain its suit against Mor-
ton Salt."
III. Justifications for the Copyright Misuse Defense
Until recently, the misuse defense did not exist in the copyright
context. Courts either found the defense inapplicable in copyright in-
fringement actions or held that misuse existed only to the extent an
antitrust violation was found, thus merging misuse into antitrust law.
But the existence of misuse as an independent defense to copyright
infringement is wholly supported and justified.
First, the parallel development of copyright and patent law justifies
the availability of the copyright misuse defense. Second, the misuse
defense is distinguishable from an antitrust counterclaim, and should,
therefore, be considered as a separate inquiry.
A. Parallel Development of the Copyright and Patent Laws
Some courts have held that the misuse defense is inapplicable in the
context of copyright infringement actions.61 However, an historical
approach to patent and copyright law provides the rationale for ap-
plying the misuse defense in these cases. 62 Patent law in England de-
54. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 22:10 at 452; Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v.
Best Seam, Inc., 616 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1980).
55. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 26.9, at 466-67.
56. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 26.9, at 468, § 28:34 at 344; Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seif-
fhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S.
661 (1944).
57. See supra note 56.
58. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 28:35, at 348; Republic Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo
Utilities, 319 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1963).
59. The result would be an "untied" license.
60. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 28:35, at 348-49.
61. See supra note 28.
62. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1990).
1992]
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veloped during the sixteenth century when the English Crown
commonly granted to certain individuals the exclusive rights (known
as "letters patent") to produce, import and/or sell goods throughout
England.63 Because of the monopolistic situation this practice cre-
ated, widespread abuses such as price inflation and product shortages
became rampant.64 Parliament addressed these problems by passing
the Statute of Monopolies, 65 which prohibited the Crown from grant-
ing monopoly power to anyone except creators of new inventions, and
to them only for a period of fourteen years.66 This statute had the
effect of narrowing monopoly power to specific products for a limited
time, rather than permanently.67
Copyright law in England also grew out of a conflict between the
English Crown's attempt to create, and Parliament's desire to curtail,
monopolies.68 In the late seventeenth century, the Crown granted the
Stationer's Company exclusive book publishing rights in England.69
In 1710, Parliament reacted by passing the first known copyright act,
the Statute of Anne.70 The statute granted the Stationer's Company
exclusive publishing rights, but only for a limited time.71 Clearly,
"the English statutory treatment of copyright was similar to that of
patent in that the creator was granted a monopoly for a limited time
only." 72
The English concept of copyright and patent law was received in
America by the Constitution's Framers. 73 The Framers, like the Eng-
lish, considered the property rights protected by copyrights and pat-
ents to be similar.74 As a result, the constitutional grant which vests
in Congress the power to create both copyright and patent laws is
combined in one clause, stating a unitary purpose:
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
63. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, §§ 1:1-1:2, at 1-14.
64. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 1:2, at 8-14.
65. An Act Concerning Monopolies And Dispensations With Penal Laws, And The
Forfeitures Thereof, 21 JAC., ch. 3 (1623-24).
66. LIPSCOMB, supra note 6, § 1:5, at 29-34.
67. Id.
68. ROBERT BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 21-23 (1912).
69. WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 3-4 (6th ed. 1986). The
Stationer's Company was a publishing company established under Seventeenth Century
British law. See id.
70. 8 Anne c. 19 (1710) (cited in PATRY, supra note 69, at 4 n.6).
71. See supra note 69.
72. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 975 (4th Cir. 1990).
73. Id. at 975; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
74. PATRY, supra note 69, at 5.
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their respective Writings and Discoveries."
Both copyright and patent law share the same underlying theory;76
because the public benefits from new creations, society should en-
courage such efforts by granting authors and inventors exclusive
rights in their works." Thus, the concurrent development of patent
and copyright law in terms of both underlying theory and the sub-
stantive law demonstrates that misuse can and should be applicable as
a defense to copyright infringement, just as it has received full recog-
nition as a defense to patent infringement.7 8
B. Distinguishing Misuse from Antitrust
1. The Confusion Between Misuse and Antitrust Law
The key differences between misuse and antitrust are that: a) the
antitrust violation is a counterclaim, giving rise to damages, whereas
patent misuse is an absolute defense to an allegation of patent in-
fringement, preventing the patentee from recovering for such infringe-
ment, and b) a defendant must have been injured to raise the antitrust
counterclaim, whereas a defendant can raise the misuse defense, re-
gardless of whether it has been subjected to the misuse at all.79 To
demonstrate that plaintiff has violated the antitrust law, defendant
must meet the high standard of proving: 1) a pattern of conduct by
plaintiff in restraint of trade, and 2) that this restraint is unreasona-
ble."o An alleged infringer cannot avoid paying damages for engaging
in infringing activities by counterclaiming under the antitrust law.
Rather, a patentee who has violated the antitrust law may still recover
for infringement, but will also pay the alleged infringer damages for
creating an illegal monopoly under the antitrust law."' In contrast, to
demonstrate that the plaintiff is guilty of patent misuse, the defendant
must meet the much easier burden of proving only that plaintiff has
75. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975.
76. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975.
77. Id. This theory is popularly known as "incentive-dissemination." See Feist Pub-
lications v. Rural Tel. Serv., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
78. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975; see infra notes 95-121 and accompanying text ex-
planing why courts have been reluctant to apply the misuse defense to copyright infringe-
ment claims despite this compelling argument.
79. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1990); Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723
(1988); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911). This approach is known
as the "rule of reason" analysis. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 31.
81. See supra note 80.
1992]
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extended his property right beyond the four corners of the patent.8 2
Further, a patentee guilty of patent misuse will be unable to enforce
his patent, a but the alleged infringer will not recover damages for
successfully proving the patentee's misuse. 4
In the copyright infringement context, several courts have confused
the misuse defense with the antitrust law counterclaim. 5 These
courts have stated that for an alleged infringer to establish copyright
misuse, and thereby render a copyright unenforceable, the copyright
owner's conduct must also constitute a violation of antitrust law.8 6
The rationale provided for this approach is that only violations of the
antitrust law are sufficiently egregious to render a copyright unen-
forceable. 7 In the patent context, however, misuse can occur despite
the lack of an antitrust violation. 8 Indeed, in the patent context, an
antitrust violation gives rise to a counterclaim for damages, but does
not render the patent unenforceable, 9 as a successful defense of mis-
use does. 90 Furthermore, the antitrust and misuse doctrines address
discrete public policy considerations.9 Antitrust law deals with eco-
nomic injury to the free marketplace resulting from monopoly con-
trol.92 Misuse, on the other hand, prevents patent (and copyright)
owners from exploiting rights belonging to the public. 93 Conse-
quently, the antitrust and misuse doctrines must be properly distin-
guished from one another. 94
The confusion between misuse and antitrust law began with the
Supreme Court's decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.95 Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Systems ("CBS"), a media production company,
82. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 28.
86. See supra note 28.
87. See supra note 28.
88. See HARMON, supra note 6, § 11.3, at 374-75; but see Saturday Evening Post Co.
v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (Judge Posner declined to
follow Morton Salt except to the extent that the patent misuse rises to the level of an
antitrust violation or unclean hands).
89. See supra note 79.
90. See supra notes 5-17. Recall again that an antitrust violation gives rise to a coun-
terclaim, whereas misuse is a defense. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Fur-
ther, misuse often exists despite the lack of an antitrust violation, such as under certain
circumstances where a copyright owner "ties" a license for his creation to another prod-
uct or creation. See infra Part IV.B. for such an example.




95. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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brought an antitrust suit against Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), a
music licensing corporation, alleging also that BMI had misused
BMI's copyrights of numerous musical compositions through blanket
licensing procedures. 96 Blanket licensing requires a licensee to
purchase a license for all of the licensor's copyrights, even if the licen-
see wishes to use only one copyrighted work.97 Blanket licensing is
similar to "tying" in that it requires a licensee to purchase more than
it should be required to under the intellectual property grant. CBS
alleged that, in order to obtain licenses for the songs it did want, BMI
required CBS to purchase licenses for songs it did not want. 98 This,
CBS claimed, violated the antitrust law, and that if it did not violate
the antitrust law, it constituted misuse.99 The Supreme Court re-
versed the district court's finding of an antitrust violation and held
that BMI's blanket licensing procedures did not violate the antitrust
law."° The Court stated: "[w]e reverse the judgment, and the copy-
right misuse judgment dependent upon it.'' 1°
The use of "and" in this sentence implies that a misuse finding de-
pends upon a finding of an antitrust violation. 102 It was apparent,
however, that in the context of the case, CBS attached misuse to the
antitrust counterclaim only as a secondary argument. The case was
decided, both in the district court and the appellate court, solely on
the basis of antitrust principles, such as whether BMI had created an
unreasonable restraint on trade.10 3
The misuse analysis should not focus on whether there has been an
unreasonable restraint on trade."°4 Rather, the focus should be on the
copyright grant, and whether the owner has exceeded his rights under
this grant. 05 Nevertheless, since the BMI decision, courts have been
either unwilling to apply the misuse defense, or have applied it only
on the ground that if the defense is available, the level of misuse nec-
essary to assert it must rise to a violation of antitrust law. 06
For example, in Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnel-
ley Info. Publishing,0 7 Donnelley Information Publishing ("Donnel-




100. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977, n.17 (4th Cir. 1990).
103. Id; see supra note 95.
104. See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 28.
107. 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991).
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ley") defended Bellsouth Advertising and Publishing's ("Bellsouth")
infringement claim on the ground that Bellsouth had misused its
copyright of a yellow pages directory.'0 8 A yellow pages copyright
protects the format and layout of the directory, but not the factual
information contained within it.'0 9 Donnelley alleged that Bellsouth
had overextended its copyright by restricting competing directory
companies from using the factual information in its yellow pages.
The court declined to apply the misuse doctrine in this copyright in-
fringement action, because it found that Bellsouth had not overex-
tended its copyright and, therefore, "there [was] no antitrust
violation." 10
The court's reasoning in Bellsouth simply side-stepped the issue.
Donnelley had not argued that Bellsouth had violated antitrust law by
exercising monopolistic power in restraint of trade. Rather, Donnel-
ley contended that Bellsouth had misused its copyright by extending
the copyright grant beyond its lawful scope. Thus, Donnelley's actual
argument was lost in the murkiness of the antitrust law. Indeed, the
court raised the antitrust issue on its own initiative, apparently con-
fusing the legal arguments behind Donnelley's claim of misuse with
antitrust principles.
The decision in United Telephone Co. of Missouri v. Johnson Pub-
lishing Co.," illustrates this confusion. Johnson Publishing Co.
("Johnson") argued that United Telephone Co. ("United") misused
its copyright of white page listings by "tying""' 2 an uncopyrighted
customer list to its licenses of the copyrighted white pages. The court,
referring to the licensing practice, stated: "[this practice] does not in
itself demonstrate an effort to restrain competition." '" 3 The court re-
fused to apply the misuse defense: "assuming arguendo, that an anti-
trust violation is a defense in a copyright infringement action.., the
stipulated facts in this case do not support [the] ... contention that
[United] 'misused' its copyright.""' 4
The court in United Telephone accepted a "tying" practice because
the practice did not restrain trade in violation of the antitrust laws." 3
108. Id. at 960.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 961.
111. 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988).
112. See supra note 13.
113. United Telephone, 855 F.2d at 612.
114. Id. at 611-12 (emphasis added). Note that the court assumed arguendo that an
antitrust violation is a defense to infringement. In fact, it only constitutes a counterclaim.
See supra notes 79-84.
115. United Telephone, 855 F.2d at 611-12.
[Vol. XX
COPYRIGHT MISUSE DEFENSE
However, Johnson alleged misuse, not restraint of trade, as a defense.
Johnson alleged that it was unfair to enforce a copyright where the
owner had extended its grant beyond that which was copyrighted in
the first place.I16 Johnson argued only that United's conduct violated
the policy objectives underlying the copyright laws. Nevertheless, the
court allowed United's tying practice to continue. Despite the seem-
ing applicability of the misuse doctrine in this case, United was per-
mitted to recover for copyright infringement because United's
conduct did not violate antitrust law.11 7
Similarly, in USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc.," 1 the Seventh
Circuit recognized that "[t]he doctrine [of misuse] arose before there
was any significant body of federal antitrust law, and reached matur-
ity long before that law ... attained its present scope." 119 But the
court nonetheless stated that "[i]f misuse claims are not tested by con-
ventional antitrust principles, by what principles shall they be
tested?"' 20
The principle with which to test the misuse defense is the scope of
the copyright grant, rather than "conventional antitrust princi-
ples."'' To argue, as the Seventh Circuit did in USM Corp., that the
misuse defense "reached maturity" long before antitrust laws devel-
oped, but that the only principles available to apply the misuse de-
fense are the antitrust laws is illogical. If misuse was firmly rooted
before antitrust ever existed, some principles must have been used
before antitrust laws were developed. Clearly, then, the defense of
copyright misuse should be viewed separately from antitrust law.
2. Recent Cases Distinguishing Misuse from Antitrust Law
Recent cases have applied the misuse defense to render a copyright
unenforceable despite the lack of an antitrust violation.1 22 For exam-
ple, the Northern District of Illinois, in qad. inc. v. ALN Associates,121
refused to enforce qad's copyright of a computer program because it
failed to disclose that the computer program itself contained material
116. Id. at 610.
117. Id. at 611-12.
118. 694 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1982).
119. Id. at 512.
120. Id. at 512. The Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed this position in Saturday Eve-
ning Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and
dismissed in part on other grounds, 974 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992), where it held that "a no
contest clause in a copyright licensing agreement is valid unless shown to violate antitrust
law." Id. at 1200.
121. See infra, part IV.
122. See supra note 29.
123. 770 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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copied from work in the public domain.' 4 The court held that qad's
conduct constituted copyright misuse 2 5 because it had extended the
copyright privilege beyond the scope of the grant, violating the theo-
ries underlying copyright law. 26 The court concluded that it "should
not and will not offer its aid to a copyright holder whose actions run
counter to the purpose of the copyright itself."'" 7 The copyright
owner's failure to disclose that it copied part of its work from the
public domain did not violate the antitrust law.' 2 Nevertheless, qad's
copyright was held unenforceable because its conduct was violative of
the "purpose of the copyright itself," by extending the copyright be-
yond the scope of the grant. 29
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reyn-
olds, 130 refused to enforce Lasercomb America's ("Lasercomb") com-
puter software copyright because of copyright misuse.' 3' Lasercomb
had licensed copies of its copyrighted computer software program
("Interact") to users who modified the software for their own pur-
poses. 3 2 Lasercomb sued these licensees, invoking a provision in its
license agreement which prevented any development of Interact."'
The licensees argued that this provision constituted copyright
misuse. ' 34
The Lasercomb court held that Lasercomb had committed copy-
right misuse by attempting to extend its copyright to an area outside
of the copyright grant, "regardless of whether such conduct
amount[ed] to an antitrust violation."'' 35 The court specifically ad-
dressed the antitrust issue, stating:
a misuse need not be a violation of antitrust law in order to com-
prise an equitable defense to an infringement action. The question
is not whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of
antitrust law, . . . but whether the copyright is being used in a
manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a
124. Id. at 1263-65.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1270-71.
127. Id.
128. Of course, this type of conduct can violate the Sherman Act, but only if the con-
duct also constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. See supra note 80 and accompa-
nying text.
129. qad, inc. v. ALN Assoc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd in part
and dismissed in part on other grounds, 974 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992).
130. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
131. Id. at 978-79.
132. Id. at 970-73.
133. Id.
134. Id.




The courts in qad. inc. and Lasercomb based their decisions on pub-
lic policy notions underlying copyright law, independent of the anti-
trust laws.' 37 The message those courts sent is clear: "[t]ry to get too
much mileage out of a copyright and you may lose it entirely."'' 3  To
state that misuse must "rise to the level of an antitrust violation" sub-
sumes the misuse defense into antitrust law. The purpose of the mis-
use defense is to prevent copyright holders from engaging in
misconduct that does not necessarily violate the antitrust law, but is,
nevertheless, an illegal extension of the copyright grant violative of
the public policies underlying copyright law.' 39 Thus, the process of
grafting antitrust law into the copyright misuse defense inquiry is con-
fusing to parties, courts and Congress,140 counterproductive to the
policies of the copyright law, and incorrect. In short, the "antitrust
law" approach should be abandoned.
3. A Recent Commentary Distinguishing Misuse from Antitrust
Law
One commentator, recognizing that "the criteria of antitrust law
alone cannot fully protect the public interest,"' 4' suggests another ap-
proach: "[iun addition to antitrust standards, courts should apply sub-
stantive principles governing copyrightability to identify instances of
copyright misuse."'' 42  The problem with this approach is that
copyrightability determines validity, and not enforceability. 14  To be
copyrightable, a work must be original, fixed in a tangible medium of
136. Id. at 978.
137. See supra notes 123-136 and accompanying text.
138. Daniel Moskowitz, Companies Warned against Abusing Power of Patents, WASH.
POST, Oct. 15, 1990, at F34.
139. Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. Broadcast Music, Inc., No. 90-0262, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11389, at *132 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1991).
140. In 1983, 1984 and 1985, the Reagan Administration proposed, but Congress re-
jected, legislation that would limit copyright misuse to conduct that also constituted an
antitrust violation. Daily Report For Executives (BNA), DER No. 11, at 16 (Jan. 16,
1985); Daily Report For Executives (BNA), DER No. 11, at 7 (Jan. 18, 1984); Daily
Report For Executives (BNA), DER No. 124, at B-1 (Jun. 27, 1983). Thus, both the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government have implicitly recognized
the defense of copyright misuse, but have explicitly rejected the notion that misuse must
rise to the level of an antitrust violation. However, Congress has statutorily limited the
availability of the patent misuse defense independent of an antitrust violation in certain
circumstances. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1992).
141. Note, supra note 11 at 1303.
142. Id. at 1304.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
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expression and the expression of an idea.'" If a work meets these
criteria, the copyright for the work is valid.' 45 These criteria, how-
ever, are unrelated to the issue of whether the copyright owner, once
obtaining a valid copyright registration, uses it in a way that extends
the grant beyond its proper scope. Indeed, a copyright may be valid,
but may nevertheless be unenforceable because of the copyright
owner's misuse. 146 Thus, this "copyrightability" approach merges the
misuse inquiry with the issue of copyrightability, and fails to enunci-
ate a workable standard for analyzing the misuse defense.
IV. A Substantive Approach to Copyright Misuse
A. The "Scope of the Grant" Test
The "scope of the grant" test both distinguishes misuse from other
defenses and is applicable over a broad range of situations. While
many courts have rejected the scope of the grant test,' some recent
cases have applied the test in the context of copyright infringement
actions without fully articulating it.' 41 Under the test, copyright mis-
use would operate as an affirmative defense to a suit for copyright
infringement.' 49 As in patent misuse, the defendant would have to
prove copyright misuse by a preponderance of the evidence. 50 To
prove misuse, the alleged infringer would be required to show that the
copyright owner: 1) acted intentionally and in bad faith, and
2) claimed rights outside the scope of the copyright grant.' 5'
The scope of the grant test involves two steps. First, the court must
define the scope of the copyright. 5 2 This simply involves reading the
copyright registration and understanding what the grant protects.
Second, the court must analyze the trial evidence and determine
whether the copyright owner has intentionally used his copyright in a
way that exceeds the scope of the grant as defined in the first step. If
he has, he has misused his copyright, rendering it unenforceable until
144. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
146. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
149. Webb, supra note 7, at 340-41; Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970
(4th Cir. 1990).
150. See supra note 53.
151. See supra note 54-55.
152. See qad, inc. v. ALN Assoc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1270-71 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd in
part and dismissed in part on other grounds, 974 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992) 1270-71;
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 970-71.
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the misconduct is corrected. 53
B. An Example Employing the "Scope of the Grant" Test
To understand the scope of the grant test, an analogy to the Morton
Salt case is helpful.' 54 Assume that G.S. Suppiger owned a copyright
on a computer program which controlled the dispensing of salt into
cans of food (rather than a patent on the dispensing machine itself).
Recall that G.S. Suppiger also manufactured and sold the salt tablets
themselves. Assume that G.S. Suppiger licensed this computer pro-
gram, but conditioned the license upon the purchase of G.S. Sup-
piger's salt tablets.
Applying the scope of the grant test, the court must analyze
whether the owner is claiming rights outside the scope of the copy-
right grant.155 To do so, the court will look to the copyright registra-
tion to decide whether the grant has been extended. Here, the
plaintiff's grant is for a computer software program. Clearly, the salt
tablets are outside the scope of the copyright grant. Consequently, a
court would find that the plaintiff, G.S. Suppiger, had misused its
copyright, rendering it unenforceable until the license is no longer
conditioned upon the sale of salt tablets.
The above example of "tying" a registered work to an unregistered
one would constitute misuse under the scope of the grant approach.
Unless the unregistered work falls within the scope of the registered
one, the copyright owner has misused his copyright. In such a case,
even though the conduct does not violate the antitrust law, the copy-
right owner should not be permitted to maintain an action for in-
fringement unless the misconduct is corrected.
C. Criticisms of the "Scope of the Grant" Test
The courts refusing to apply the scope of the grant test have not
directly criticized the test itself.' 56 Rather, these courts simply find
that the misuse defense is inapplicable in copyright infringement ac-
tions, 157 or that the defense only applies where the misuse rises to the
level of an antitrust violation.'5 8
We have seen that the policies underlying the patent and copyright
153. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
155. Of course, intent and bad faith must also be proved. See supra note 54 and ac-
companying text.
156. See supra note 27-28 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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law, as well as their parallel nature, justify the applicability of misuse
as a defense to copyright infringement to the same extent it is a de-
fense to patent infringement. 1 9 There is no justification for arguing
that the defense is wholly inapplicable in copyright infringement ac-
tions. 16° Furthermore, we have seen that misuse is distinguishable
from an antitrust violation.1 61 Thus, the counterproductive approach
of finding misuse only when the misuse rises to the level of an anti-
trust violation is equally unjustified. 162
One commentator, however, has criticized the scope of the grant
approach on the ground that it is too subjective: "[the test] presup-
poses some transcendent notion of what constitutes 'natural' or
'proper' patent or copyright and thus fails to identify any legal rules
or standards for fixing the boundaries of legitimate conduct."'1 63 This
is simply not so. The scope of the grant test presupposes nothing at
all and identifies a clear and identifiable boundary - the copyright
grant itself. This is easily identifiable as courts in infringement cases
must, in the first instance, determine the scope of the plaintiff's copy-
right protection. The theory behind the test is that, without assuming
anything at all, one can read the copyright grant to determine if its
limitations are being exceeded. Although there is no magic formula,
the scope of the grant approach provides what the commentator be-
lieves it lacks - a clear legal standard for fixing the boundaries of
legitimate conduct. The scope of the grant test is a test which puts the
copyright misuse defense in perspective and establishes the viability of
the defense in copyright infringement actions.
V. Conclusion
The property rights granted to the owner of a patent or copyright
do not extend beyond that which is granted in the patent or copy-
right.16 Thus, a court should refuse to enforce a copyright where the
owner has extended the grant to property not covered by that copy-
right.1 65 Although the older cases reject the notion of copyright mis-
use, 16 6 the modern view is that misuse should prevent a copyright
owner from recovering for infringement where he has impermissibly
159. See supra part III.A.
160. Id.
161. See supra Part III.B.
162. Id.
163. Note, supra note 11, at 1295.
164. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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extended the copyright grant beyond its lawful scope.167 Further-
more, the recent cases which refuse to allow the defense have based
their decisions on the erroneous assumption that misuse must rise to
the level of an antitrust violation before the defense may be as-
serted. 168 On the other hand, those courts which allow the defense
independent of whether an antitrust violation has occurred, ground
their decisions on well-founded, long-existing policies underlying the
copyright law. 169
For years the courts have failed to distinguish misuse from the anti-
trust law. These legal concepts are, however, clearly distinguishable
from one another. The misuse defense is inherent in the policies un-
derlying the copyright and patent law. Thus, the misuse defense is
viable in copyright infringement actions and should prevent a copy-
right owner from enforcing his copyright if he has impermissibly ex-
tended it beyond the scope of the copyright grant. In sum, this Note
advocates use of the scope of the grant approach to provide a worka-
ble standard for determining whether a copyright owner is guilty of
copyright misuse.
David Scher
167. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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